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Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. How-
ever, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what
conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward)
or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people
use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning
before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1
and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay
(Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards)
people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These find-
ings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces
nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction.
We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.
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(non)cooperation, decision timing, nonconsequential reasoning, punishment, reward1 | INTRODUCTION
Sanctions are often proposed as effective means to promote coopera-
tion. This proposition is supported by numerous empirical studies dem-
onstrating that positive sanctions (i.e., rewards like bonuses, prices, or
privileges) and negative sanctions (i.e., punishments like fines, penal-
ties, or restrictions) stimulate cooperation and minimize noncoopera-
tion (for overviews, see Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Van Dijk,
Molenmaker, & De Kwaadsteniet, 2015). However, to successfully
implement sanction opportunities, it is not only important to know that
sanctions can work. It is also important to know under what conditions
people are actually willing to administer sanctions. After all, sanctions
can only show their effects if those in control of rewards and punish-
ments are willing to bear the costs of administering them (i.e., money,
effort, and/or risk). The current research addresses this critical- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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n Making Published by John Wilequestion by focusing on the timing of sanction decisions. We examine
whether decision timing affects the willingness to employ rewards for
cooperation and punishments for noncooperation.
Although one can decide to sanction others' behavior at various
moments in time, it involves a decision either before or after the others'
behavior. Consider, for instance, managers in organizations who have
sanctions at their disposal to steer employees' behavior in the desired
direction. When evaluating the past performance of their employees,
they can decide whether employees who furthered the success of the
organization should be rewarded (e.g., by giving them a bonus) and
whether employees who weakened the success of the organization
should be punished (e.g., by cancelling their vacation leave). In other
words, they can determine the sanctions after the employees' perfor-
mance. By contrast, managers can also decide beforehand whether
those employees who will further the organization's success in the future- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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242 MOLENMAKER ET AL.should be rewarded and whether those employees who will weaken the
organization's success in the future should be punished. Sanctions are, in
fact, quite often contingent on future behavior. Annual performance
appraisals, for example, often include binding agreements with
employees about their required job performance and contingent positive
and negative sanctions (e.g., promotions, terminations, and transfers).
Until now, very little research has investigated whether the will-
ingness to sanction behavior beforehand differs from the willingness
to sanction behavior afterwards. This is unfortunate because a better
understanding of the impact of decision timing on the use of sanctions
has implications for managers in organizations, policymakers, and
sanctioning researchers, as it would demonstrate whether, all else
being equal, the decision environment beforehand can be regarded
the same as the decision environment afterwards.1Note that (non)consequentialism refers to a much broader account in the phil-
osophical and decision theoretic literature (see, e.g., Kamm, 2013).1.1 | The need for sanctions
Before further addressing the relevance of timing for sanctioning
decisions, we first elaborate on why sanctioning is often needed to pro-
mote cooperation. There are many situations (at work, home, or other
places) that require people to cooperate with others. Although coopera-
tive behavior is beneficial to the collective, it is not self‐evident that indi-
viduals will cooperate. To give just one example, employees may be more
motivated to further their own careers than to further the success of
their organization. Personal interest may thus collide with the collective
interest. Situations in which personal interests conflict with collective
interests are generally referred to as social dilemmas (for an overview,
see Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). It is within this con-
text of social dilemmas that we investigate the willingness to sanction.
Public transport, medical care, clean environments, and also
corporate citizenship within organizations are all examples of goods
and services that stand or fall with individuals' willingness to provide
and maintain these goods and services because they can, in fact, be used
freely by everyone (Samuelson, 1954). If too many people choose not to
contribute to the provision of these public goods, it may eventually be
impossible to provide them and all will be worse off (Dawes, 1980).
However, public goods provision is not only a problem on a global, soci-
etal, or organizational level; it is a problem for groups in general. After all,
the performance of groups is usually based on each group member's
effort to attain the goals of the group, and if too many group members
withhold their effort (i.e., free ride), the performance of the group may
be jeopardized. To prevent collective failure, it is often necessary to
make cooperation more attractive and noncooperation less attractive.
Straightforward tools to increase the relative attractiveness of
cooperation over noncooperation are rewards for those who cooper-
ate and punishments for those who do not (Messick & Brewer,
1983; Van Lange, Rockenbach, & Yamagishi, 2014). Indeed, several
studies have shown that the opportunity to use punishments, even if
these incur costs to the punisher, enables people to self‐govern social
dilemmas (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gürerk, Irlenbusch, &
Rockenbach, 2006; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak,
2009; Yamagishi, 1986). Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992)
demonstrated that in small groups, people tend to punish those group
members who free ride on the generosity of others. A sanctioningopportunity enhances the level of cooperation in such groups.
Furthermore, despite the fact that sanctioning is generally a costly
course of action (Yamagishi, 1986), some people are willing to costly
punish others' selfishness even when direct gains for themselves are
absent (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
Whereas prior research thus demonstrated that people may be
willing to use costly punishments for noncooperation, the use of costly
rewards for cooperation has received far less attention. This is remark-
able, as rewards are just as effective as punishments in promoting coop-
eration (e.g., Balliet et al., 2011). In addition, the scarce research done
on rewarding revealed that people generally prefer to administer
rewards over punishments (Molenmaker, De Kwaadsteniet, & Van Dijk,
2014, 2016). Thus, to identify whether the willingness to promote
cooperation before the behavior differs from the willingness to promote
cooperation after the behavior, one should address both reward of
cooperation and punishment of noncooperation. In the present
research, we therefore take both types of sanctions into consideration
and investigate their sensitivity to the timing of sanctioning decisions.1.2 | The timing of sanctioning decisions
Why would the timing of sanctioning decisions affect the willingness to
employ costly rewards and punishments? To answer this question, we
draw attention to the fact that a decision beforehand differs markedly
from a decision afterwards. One of the most apparent differences is that
afterwards people decide about the sanctioning of behavior that has
actually taken place in the past, whereas beforehand people decide
about the sanctioning of behavior that may or may not take place in
the future. We argue that this fundamental difference between facing
behavior that did actually occur in the past (i.e., afterwards) and behavior
that may possibly occur in the future (i.e., beforehand) radically alters the
decision environment. More importantly, we aim to show that this
alteration of the decision environment impacts the willingness to
reward cooperation and punish noncooperation.
Decision timing matters, first and foremost, because beforehand (as
opposed to afterwards) it is not known yet whether particular behavior
will actually occur and sanctions thus are contingent on others' future
behavior. Research on the disjunction effect (e.g., Shafir, 1994; Shafir,
Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) has demonstrated
that uncertain situations may induce what has been termed
“nonconsequential reasoning” (Shafir & Tversky, 1992), which refers to
people's tendency to make decisions that are sometimes inconsistent
with the decisions that they would make based on an evaluation of
the anticipated consequences.1 If the outcome of a particular situation
is unknown, this often leads to a loss of acuity and the discounting of
uncertain information. This is because thinking through the reasons
and implications of all courses of action may be too cognitively and
motivationally demanding (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The presence of
uncertainty, as Tversky and Shafir (1992) put it, “tends to blur the pic-
ture and makes it harder for people to see through the implications of
each outcome” (p. 306) as “it requires people to assume momentarily
as true something that may in fact be false” (Shafir & Tversky, 1992,
MOLENMAKER ET AL. 243p. 469), and even if people may consider all the relevant outcomes, they
“may not see their own preferences very clearly” (Shafir & Tversky,
1992, p. 456). Consequently, people discount uncertain information
and are often less likely to make decisions based on uncertain informa-
tion than on certain information (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003).
To illustrate this, it is informative to consider an example given by
Tversky and Shafir (1992). In one of their studies on the disjunction
effect, participants were presented the hypothetical scenario in which
they had just taken a qualifying exam and had passed the exam, failed
the exam, or did not know whether they had passed or failed. Next,
their willingness to book a vacation to Hawaii was measured. The
majority of the participants were willing to book the vacation when
they knew that they had passed the exam. The same preference was
observed when they had failed the exam. However, when they did
not know whether they had passed or failed the exam, only a minority
of the participants were willing to book the vacation. Participants'
decisiveness to book the vacation was thus hampered by the
uncertainty about the outcome of the exam, which is an example of
nonconsequential reasoning. After all, if they would have known their
test result, they would have booked the vacation, regardless of
whether they had passed or failed the exam.
We believe that a similar disjunction effect may be observed
when sanctioning decisions have to be made beforehand. Under these
conditions, it may be too cognitively and/or motivationally demanding
to think through the reasons and implications of all possible sanction
decisions in a social dilemma and to form clear preferences (see
Tversky & Shafir, 1992). As a result, the uncertain information about
others' possible behavior may be discounted (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg,
2003), and people may be less willing to employ costly sanctions
before (as compared with after) the occurrence of others' behavior,
regardless of whether they decide about rewarding cooperation or
about punishing noncooperation. We thus argue that because others'
actual behavior still has to take place in the decision environment
beforehand, this may induce nonconsequential reasoning. If we could
demonstrate that people are indeed less willing to sanction
beforehand than afterwards, this would not only advance the
understanding of how people make sanctioning decisions, but this
would also reveal that nonconsequential reasoning can hamper
people's willingness to employ costly rewards for cooperation and
punishments for noncooperation.1.3 | Strategy method versus direct‐response
method
To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether the
willingness to sanction differs between the decision environment
beforehand and the decision environment afterwards. However, it
should be noted that the timing of decisions does connect to studies
that were specifically aimed at investigating the behavioral validity of
two experimental methods frequently used in behavioral decision‐
making research: the strategy method and the direct‐response method
(see, e.g., Brandts & Charness, 2011; Brosig, Weimann, & Yang,
2003; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Quercia, 2012; Selten, 1967). The
strategy method requires individuals to make precompiled strategiesfor responding to all feasible choices that others could possibly make
(i.e., decide about multiple possible choices), whereas the direct‐
response method requires individuals to only respond to others' actual
choices (i.e., decide about a single choice). Although these two
response methods were not designed to study the impact of decision
timing, the strategy method resembles situations in which sanction
decisions are made beforehand and the direct‐response method
resembles situations in which sanction decisions are made afterwards.
However, there also are notable differences. First of all, people in
the decision environment beforehand do not necessarily have to make
full precompiled strategies for all feasible choices that could possibly
occur, as is the case with the strategy method. Whereas the strategy
method seems to force people to think through the implications of
all possible outcomes, in reality, they often lack the cognitive or
motivational capacity to do this (e.g., Shafir & Tversky, 1992), thereby
giving rise to nonconsequential reasoning. Second, in the literature on
the strategy method and the direct‐response method, the intensity of
experienced emotions is often suggested as an explanation for the
observed behavioral differences (e.g., Brandts & Charness, 2011).
Scholars from various disciplines have identified emotions as an
important proximate mechanism underlying the willingness to employ
sanctions (e.g., De Kwaadsteniet, Rijkhoff, & Van Dijk, 2013; Fehr &
Gächter, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Rotemberg, 2008; Wang,
Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2009), and emotions may particularly emerge
in direct response (and not in strategy response) to others' behavior.
Although the experience of emotions can indeed alter the decision
environment (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003),
it is important to note that sanctioning does not necessarily have to
be attributed to “heated tempers”. The willingness to sanction can also
result from deliberate reasoning (see Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, &
Bembenek, 2003). When, for instance, impartial third parties are in
control of sanctions, as often is the case in real‐life social dilemmas
(e.g., managers in organizations), emotions do not necessarily play a
role (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Whitson, Wang, See, Baker, &
Murnighan, 2015). Taken together, the above makes apparent that
we have to go beyond prior research that compared the strategy
method with the direct‐response method to examine whether
decision timing has an impact on the willingness to reward coopera-
tion and punish noncooperation.1.4 | The present research
We test the prediction that people are less willing to sanction
when sanctioning decisions are made before (as compared with
after) the occurrence of others' behavior. In our first two experi-
ments, we use a third‐party sanction paradigm in which participants
are impartial observers with the opportunity to reward a cooperator
or punish a noncooperator (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004;
Molenmaker et al., 2014). The reason for using a third‐party sanc-
tion paradigm is twofold. First of all, it resembles the position of
the authorities who are mostly responsible for monitoring and sanc-
tioning others' behavior (e.g., managers in organizations). Second, it
eliminates the likelihood that participants' interpretations of others'
behavior are colored by self‐interest.
244 MOLENMAKER ET AL.We manipulate the timing of the sanction decision by presenting
participants with others' behavior either that either might possibly
occur in the future (i.e., beforehand) or had actually occurred in the
past (i.e., afterwards). Subsequently, we measure participants' willing-
ness to sanction that particular behavior by having them decide
whether to employ a sanction (i.e., choice to sanction) and decide
about the size of sanction they employed (i.e., sanction size). We
examine both the choice to sanction and the sanction size because
both are indicators of the willingness to sanction (Molenmaker et al.,
2014, 2016). Note that participants who had to make the sanctioning
decisions beforehand were informed that their decisions were binding
and would actually be executed if the behavior would occur in the
future. Thus, their sanction decisions were as real as for those who
decided afterwards, the only difference being that their specified
sanction decision for a particular behavior would only be executed
when that behavior actually occurs (i.e., sanctions were contingent
on future behavior).
Moreover, in a third experiment, we used a management sce-
nario as experimental paradigm to test the impact of decision
timing on the willingness to sanction and its underlying processes
associated with nonconsequential reasoning. Participants had to
imagine being in a situation in which one of their employees might
behave noncooperatively in the future (i.e., beforehand scenario) or
had behaved noncooperatively in the past (i.e., afterwards scenario),
and we assessed whether they formed clear sanctioning
preferences.2 | EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, participants were third‐party observers of a one‐
shot public good game (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Molenmaker
et al., 2014). As third‐party observers, participants themselves were
not involved in the public good game but had the opportunity to
reward or the opportunity to punish their group members (Sanction
Type manipulation). These sanctioning decisions had to be made
either before or after the group members had made their choices
(Decision Timing manipulation). In addition, we also explored whether
the (anticipated and actual) emotional reactions to behavior differed
across these two timing moments. We predicted that people would
sanction others' behavior less often and more mildly when they had
to decide beforehand (as compared with afterwards).2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Participants and design
We recruited 159 students from Leiden University (97 women and 62
men; Mage = 21.44 years, SDage = 3.74) to participate in an experiment
on “group decision making.”2 A 2 (Decision Timing: Beforehand vs.
Directly afterwards) × 2 (Sanction Type: Reward vs. Punishment)
between‐participants factorial design was used.2For Experiments 1 and 2, we aimed to recruit as many participants as possible
within the given time available in the lab (approximately 2 weeks per
experiment).2.1.2 | Procedure
Participants were seated in separate cubicles, each containing a
personal computer to give instructions and register their responses.
Assignment to one of the four conditions was randomly deter-
mined by a computer‐automated procedure. Participants were
instructed that they had to perform a joint task with four fellow
participants whose identities were unknown to them. The choices
they would make in the joint task determined how much extra
money they could earn on top of the standard initial participation
fee. Participants learned that whether they would actually receive
this extra money would be determined by a lottery after the study
was conducted.
The participants were instructed that they were randomly
assigned to a different role than the other four persons in the
joint task (for a similar procedure, see Molenmaker et al., 2014).
Their role was to observe the other four persons performing a
one‐shot public good game. Each person in the public good game
would be endowed with €10 (which is approximately US $12) that
they could either keep for themselves or contribute to a common
pool. When contributed to the common pool, the €10 would be
multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally among the four persons in
the public good game (i.e., each would receive €3.75). Thus, the
participants learned that the four persons had to make a dichoto-
mous choice between being cooperative (i.e., contributing the €10
to the common pool) or not being cooperative (i.e., keeping the
€10 for themselves). After participants read the instructions about
the public good game, we posed four practice questions to ensure
that they understood the task. The correct answer was disclosed
after answering each question.
After this, participants read the instructions about their own
role in the joint task. The instructions explained that they would
be endowed with 100 points (worth €0.10 each) per person. In
the reward conditions, participants could keep these points for
themselves, but they could also assign points as increment points
(we never used the word “reward”). The value of the assigned
increment points would be multiplied by 3 and added to the
individual outcome of the person concerned. Thus, it would cost
the participant €0.10 to increase a group member's outcome with
€0.30. The instructions in the punishment conditions were
identical, except that they could assign points as decrement points
(we never used the word “punishment”) and the value of the
assigned decrement points would be multiplied by 3 and
subtracted from the individual outcome of the person concerned.
Thus, it would cost the participant €0.10 to decrease a group
member's outcome with €0.30 (for a similar procedure, see
Molenmaker et al., 2014).
In the instructions about participants' role in the joint task, we
also introduced our manipulation of decision timing. In the before-
hand conditions, participants learned that they had to decide about
assigning points before the others actually decided about contribut-
ing their €10. That is, participants would have to compose a bind-
ing strategy for responding to choices that the persons could make
in the public good game. In addition, they were informed that they
would have to make separate strategies for each person in the
MOLENMAKER ET AL. 245public good game.3 In contrast, participants in the directly after-
wards conditions learned that they had to decide about assigning
points after the group members had decided about contributing
their €10. Thus, they would have to respond to the choices that
the persons had actually made in the public good game.
Participants in all conditions also learned that the other four per-
sons would be informed beforehand about the presence of a fifth per-
son in the joint task who would have the opportunity to increase
(reward conditions) or decrease (punishment conditions) their individ-
ual outcomes. Moreover, the instructions in the beforehand conditions
also stated that group members would not be informed what this fifth
person had decided before they themselves had decided about con-
tributing their €10. Note that we thus merely manipulated when par-
ticipants would make their sanction decisions, not when their group
members would learn about the sanctioning decisions. In this way,
we ruled out the possibility that participants in the beforehand condi-
tions would opt for sanctioning to influence the four persons' choices
in the public good game, whereas participants in the afterwards condi-
tions would not have this opportunity because the choices in the pub-
lic good game had already been made. To ensure comprehension of
their role in the joint task, we again posed four practice questions with
the correct answer disclosed after answering each question.
Subsequently, the joint task started, and participants were
endowed with their first 100 points. In the beforehand conditions,
we presented participants with the possibility that a person (named
person M) would contribute his or her €10 to the common pool in
the reward condition or would keep it for himself or herself in the pun-
ishment condition.4 We reminded participants that this was a possible
choice that person M could make and that their decision would be
executed if it would turn out that person M would actually make this
choice (i.e., their decision was binding). In the reward condition, we
first asked whether the participants wanted to assign points as incre-
ment points and when they decided to assign increment points to per-
son M, they had to indicate how many increment points they assigned.
The procedure in the punishment condition was identical, except that
they could assign points as decrement points.
In the directly afterwards conditions, we first asked participants to
wait until all four persons had read their instructions and had made
their choice in the public good game, which took about a minute. Next,
they received the (bogus) feedback that a person (named M) had con-
tributed his or her €10 to the common pool in the reward condition or
had kept it for himself or herself in the punishment condition. In
response to this actual choice that person M had made, we first asked
participants whether they wanted to assign points as increment points
in the reward condition or as decrement points in the punishment con-
dition, and if they decided to assign points to person M, they indicated3We decided to ensure that the participants would make a sanction decision in
response to an identifiable (but anonymized) person in both the beforehand and
afterwards conditions (instead of one strategy in the beforehand conditions that
would apply to all persons in the public good game) because research by Small
and Loewenstein (2003, 2005) has shown that identifiability can influence peo-
ple's sanctioning decisions.
4To keep the beforehand and afterwards conditions as identical as possible, we
instructed participants that we would present each feasible choice one by one
instead of presenting all feasible choices at once, as in the strategy method (Sel-
ten, 1967).how many points they assigned. In all conditions, the maximum num-
ber of points participants could assign to person M was 100 points
(and the minimum was zero points).
Next, we asked participants about their emotional reactions to the
(possible) choice by person M. On a 9‐point rating scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 9 (totally), participants in the directly afterwards condi-
tions indicated to what extent nine statements currently applied to
them, whereas participants in the beforehand conditions indicated to
what extent they anticipated that these statements would apply to
them when later on it would turn out that person M had actually made
this choice. To measure participants' positive emotional reactions, we
asked them about their experience of happiness, joy, pride, admiration,
and elevation (e.g., “This choice by person M makes me feel happy”).
To measure participants' negative emotional reactions, we asked them
about their experience of anger, fury, disappointment, and contempt
(e.g., “This choice by person M makes me feel angry”).5
At this point, participants in all conditions had only learned about
person M's (possible) choice in the public good game and were asked
about their sanction response and (anticipated) emotional reactions.
Next, participants were informed that the joint task was ended. Before
the participants were thoroughly debriefed and paid (1 course credit or
€3 monetary compensation), we first checked our manipulations and
the credibility and comprehension of the joint task. Finally, after the
experiment was completed by all the participants, 10 participants were
randomly selectedwho received their actual earnings fromthe joint task.2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Manipulation checks
The manipulation of sanction type was checked by asking participants
whether they could assign increment or decrement points. All partici-
pants (100%) answered this question correctly. We checked the
manipulation of decision timing by asking participants whether they
had to decide about assigning increment points (decrement points)
before or after the other four persons made their choices in the public
good game. All participants except three (98.1%) answered this ques-
tion correctly.6 On the basis of these results, we concluded that our
manipulations were successful, and we included the data of all 159
participants in the analyses.
2.2.2 | Choice to sanction
We started by analyzing the effect of DecisionTiming (Beforehand vs.
Directly afterwards) and Sanction Type (Reward vs. Punishment) on
the proportion of participants choosing to sanction (N = 159). In accor-
dance with our prediction, a binary (Sanction Choice: 0 = not sanc-
tioned, 1 = sanctioned) logistic regression yielded a significant
DecisionTiming main effect, B = 1.04, SE = 0.47, Wald (df = 1) = 4.97,
p = .026, odds ratio = 2.84, 95% CI [1.13, 7.12]. This main effect5In our experiments, we also asked participants about their judgments to the
(possible) choice by person M, and about their sanction motives. The results of
these additional measures did not provide additional insights about the current
findings.
6Exclusion of the data of these participants did not alter the pattern of results.
TABLE 2 Number of points assigned by decision timing and sanction
type in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment Decision timing
Sanction
type
Sanction size
M SD
1 Beforehand Overall 32.72 31.98
Punishment 17.82 28.05
Reward 47.25 29.00
Afterwards Overall 40.80 36.59
Punishment 21.15 26.59
Reward 60.45 34.82
2 Beforehand Overall 22.69 31.44
Punishment 11.43 24.35
Reward 34.60 33.81
Afterwards Overall 42.30 37.04
Punishment 24.44 27.03
Reward 59.42 37.40
Directly afterwards Overall 44.95 36.11
Punishment 26.89 28.75
Reward 62.51 34.07
Delayed afterwards Overall 39.54 38.05
Punishment 21.85 25.25
Reward 56.25 40.77
246 MOLENMAKER ET AL.indicated that the proportion of participants choosing to sanction
beforehand (75.6%) was lower than the proportion of participants
choosing to sanction directly afterwards (88.8%). Moreover, the anal-
ysis yielded a significant SanctionType main effect, B = 2.19, SE = 0.58,
Wald (df = 1) = 14.37, p < .001, odds ratio = 8.91, CI [2.87, 27.58],
which showed that the proportion of participants choosing to punish
(69.6%) was lower than the proportion of participants choosing to
reward (95.0%). The impact of Decision Timing did not differ between
reward and punishment, as indicated by the nonsignificant Decision
Timing × Sanction Type interaction effect, B = 0.13, SE = 1.28, Wald
(df = 1) = 0.01, p = .921, odds ratio = 1.14, CI [0.09, 14.07]. See
Table 1 for the frequencies.
2.2.3 | Sanction size
A 2 (Decision Timing: Beforehand vs. Directly afterwards) × 2 (Sanc-
tion Type: Reward vs. Punishment) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
the number of points (N = 159) yielded a marginal significant Decision
Timing main effect, F (1, 155) = 3.06, p = .082, η2 = .01, 90% CI [.00,
.06]. As predicted, the size of the sanctions administered beforehand
(M = 32.72, SD = 31.98) was smaller than the size of the sanctions
administered directly afterwards (M = 40.80, SD = 36.59). Further-
more, the analysis yielded a significant Sanction Type main effect,
F (1, 155) = 52.90, p < .001, η2 = .25, CI [.16, .34], which showed that
the size of the punishments (M = 19.51, SD = 27.19) was smaller than
the size of the rewards (M = 53.85, SD = 32.52). The impact of
Decision Timing did again not differ between reward and punishment,
as indicated by nonsignificant Decision Timing × Sanction Type
interaction effect, F (1, 155) = 1.09, p = .298, η2 = .01, CI [.00, .04]. See
Table 2 for the mean number of points and standard deviation per
condition.
2.2.4 | Emotional reactions
We also analyzed the effects of Decision Timing (Beforehand vs.
Directly afterwards) on participants' emotional reactions. As we gave
different feedback in the reward conditions (i.e., a cooperative choice)TABLE 1 Number and percentage of participants choosing to sanction b
Experiment Decision timing Sanc
1 Beforehand Ove
P
R
Afterwards Ove
P
R
2 Beforehand Ove
P
R
Afterwards Ove
P
R
Directly afterwards Ove
P
R
Delayed afterwards Ove
P
Rand punishment conditions (i.e., a noncooperative choice), we analyzed
participants' positive emotions to the cooperative choice (i.e., the
reward conditions; N = 79) and negative emotions to the noncoopera-
tive choice (i.e., the punishment conditions; N = 78) in separate analy-
ses. A multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) on positive emotions about the
cooperative choice yielded no significant effect of Decision Timing,
V = 0.086, F (5, 74) = 1.386, p = .24, ηp
2 = .086. A MANOVA on neg-
ative emotions about the noncooperative choice also yielded no signif-
icant effect of Decision Timing, V = 0.038, F (4, 74) = 0.726, p = .58,
ηp
2 = .038. See Table 3 for the overall means and standard deviations.
Taken together, these results indicated that there was no significant
difference between the (anticipated) emotional reactions beforehand
and the (actual) emotional reactions afterwards.2.3 | Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provide first evidence for our reasoning
that decision timing impacts the willingness to employ costly rewardsy decision timing and sanction type in Experiments 1 and 2
tion type
Choice to sanction
Yes No
rall 60 (76.0%) 19 (24.0%)
unishment 23 (59.0%) 16 (41.0%)
eward 37 (92.5%) 3 (7.5%)
rall 71 (88.8%) 9 (11.2%)
unishment 32 (80.0%) 8 (20.0%)
eward 39 (97.5%) 1 (2.5%)
rall 45 (65.2%) 24 (34.8%)
unishment 15 (40.5%) 22 (59.5%)
eward 30 (93.8%) 2 (6.3%)
rall 127 (88.8%) 16 (11.2%)
unishment 61 (87.1%) 9 (12.9%)
eward 66 (90.4%) 7 (9.6%)
rall 68 (93.2%) 5 (6.8%)
unishment 34 (94.4%) 2 (5.6%)
eward 34 (91.9%) 3 (8.1%)
rall 59 (84.3%) 11 (15.7%)
unishment 27 (79.4%) 7 (20.6%)
eward 32 (88.9%) 4 (11.1%)
TABLE 3 Emotional reactions to the cooperative or noncooperative choice in Experiments 1 and 2
Feedback Emotions
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
M SD M SD
Cooperative choice Happiness 6.64 2.06 6.46 1.76
Joy 6.50 1.79 6.44 1.77
Pride 5.77 2.05 6.43 2.12
Admiration 6.65 1.92 6.77 2.02
Elevation 3.97 2.47 3.91 2.05
Noncooperative choice Anger 3.57 2.23 4.08 2.19
Fury 2.96 2.20 3.28 1.99
Disappointment 5.22 2.31 5.16 2.34
Contempt 4.14 2.33 4.84 2.19
MOLENMAKER ET AL. 247for cooperation and punishments for noncooperation. The willingness
to sanction was lower when participants decided before the behavior
than when they decided after the behavior. Participants both
rewarded and punished less often and more mildly in the decision
environment beforehand than in the decision environment afterwards.
Furthermore, the emotional reactions participants anticipated before-
hand did not seem to differ from participants' actual emotional reac-
tions directly afterwards, which is consistent with our reasoning that
sanctioning and decision timing effects do not necessarily have to be
attributed to “heated tempers”, especially when it concerns impartial
third parties, as was the case in Experiment 1. To further investigate
the reasons as to why people are less willing to sanction behavior
beforehand than afterwards, we designed Experiment 2.3 | EXPERIMENT 2
Our first experiment demonstrated that people are not as willing to
sanction beforehand as they are willing to sanction afterwards.
These results fit an explanation in terms of nonconsequential
reasoning (see also, e.g., Shafir & Tversky, 1992; Van Dijk &
Zeelenberg, 2003), which presupposes more nonconsequential rea-
soning before rather than after others' behavior. After all, only in
the decision environment beforehand, and not in the decision envi-
ronment afterwards, are sanctions contingent on behavior of which
the occurrence is not known yet.
However, an alternative explanation for the results of Experi-
ment 1 would be that, although participants were impartial third
parties, and the (anticipated) emotional reactions beforehand did
not seem to differ from the (actual) emotional reactions afterwards,
they might have had a different emotional experience of the
other's behavior in the decision environment beforehand than in
the decision environment afterwards. Therefore, they might have
been less willing to employ costly sanctions before (instead of
after) the occurrence of others' behavior. Indeed, emotional experi-
ences of future events often differ in intensity and quality from
emotional experiences of present or past events (e.g., Loewenstein,
1996; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015).
In fact, decision environments are usually characterized as “cold”
when decisions are made about future events and as “hot” when
decisions are made about present events (see Loewenstein, 1996;
Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Wang et al., 2011). Therefore, the
aim of Experiment 2 is to further explore why decision timinghas an impact on the willingness to reward cooperation and punish
noncooperation.
Although we argue that the willingness to sanction beforehand
differs from the willingness to sanction afterwards, this is not the only
temporal distinction that may alter the decision environment. In real
life, it is often the case that sanctioning decisions are not made directly
after others' behavior but at a later moment in time. Importantly,
deciding directly afterwards versus after a time delay has also been
related to the distinction between hot and cold decision environments
(see, e.g., Harinck & De Dreu, 2008; Wang et al., 2011). The fact that
emotions tend to have a relatively short life span (Fridhandler &
Averill, 1982) suggests that “hot” decision environments become less
emotionally charged after some time has passed and thus turn into
colder decision environments (see Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein
& Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). The intensity of emo-
tions may thus be lower after a time delay than directly afterwards
(see also Gross, 1998; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008). To further exam-
ine the impact of decision timing on the willingness to sanction, we
therefore focused not only on the willingness to sanction beforehand
and directly afterwards but also on the willingness to sanction after a
time delay (i.e., delayed afterwards).
Given that emotions have been identified as drivers of the will-
ingness to employ sanctions (e.g., De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2013;
Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014), but also
tend to have a relative short life span (Fridhandler & Averill, 1982),
it may very well be that people are less willing to sanction after a
time delay than directly afterwards. Preliminary support for this rea-
soning can be found in research by Wang et al. (2011) who demon-
strated that people react less punitively to others' norm
transgressions after a short time delay than when they react
directly afterwards. Their research also showed, however, that such
an effect is only observed if people are distracted during the time
delay, such that they cannot re‐arouse the experienced anger by
ruminating about the anger‐arousing stimulus (see also Fridhandler
& Averill, 1982; Gross, 1998; Harinck & De Dreu, 2008; Ray
et al., 2008). In Experiment 2, we therefore manipulated the time
delay by using the same distraction task as Wang et al. (2011) used
in one of their experiments (i.e., the dots‐estimation task; e.g.,
Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). If people experience intense emotions about
others' behavior, we expect that they would be particularly willing
to sanction in the decision environment directly afterwards, and
less so in the decision environment after a time delay (and the
decision environment beforehand).
248 MOLENMAKER ET AL.More importantly, however, a nonconsequential reasoning
account does not distinguish between whether decisions are made
directly after the behavior or only after a time delay (as in both cases,
people may be expected to engage in consequential reasoning). An
interesting implication of this is that adding a decision environment
with a time delay provides us with a useful paradigm to test whether
nonconsequential reasoning or a hot/cold distinction may explain the
results of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we thus provided another
test of the impact that decision timing has on the willingness to
sanction by focusing on the willingness to sanction beforehand,
directly afterwards, and after a time delay. Our main prediction is that
people would sanction others' behavior less often and more mildly
when they decide beforehand than when they decide afterwards,
thereby replicating the findings of Experiment 1. This pattern of
results would, first and foremost, fit the explanation in terms of
nonconsequential reasoning because this account only distinguishes
between a decision environment beforehand and a decision environ-
ment afterwards, and not between a decision environment directly
afterwards and a decision environment after a time delay. If the
hot/cold distinction would have explanatory power for the sanctioning
decisions in our research, we may also expect that people would sanc-
tion others' behavior less often and more mildly when they decide in
the decision environment after a time delay than in the decision
environment directly afterwards. Therefore, we also again measured
the (anticipated and actual) emotional reactions to the behavior.3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants and design
Two hundred fifteen students from Leiden University (148 women
and 67 men; Mage = 20.47 years, SDage = 4.09) participated in an
experiment on “group decision making” (see Footnote 1). We used a
3 (Decision Timing: Beforehand vs. Directly afterwards vs. Delayed
afterwards) × 2 (Sanction Type: Reward vs. Punishment) between‐
participants factorial design.
3.1.2 | Procedure
The procedure was almost identical to the procedure of Experiment 1.
Thus, the instructions explained that the participants' role was to
observe the four other persons performing a one‐shot public good
game. Whereas participants in Experiment 1 learned that the four per-
sons in the public good game had to decide whether they would con-
tribute their endowment of €10 to the common pool or keep it for
themselves (i.e., dichotomous choice), participants in Experiment 2
learned that the persons had to decide how many euros from their
endowment of €10 they would contribute to the common pool and
how many euros they would thus keep for themselves (i.e., a continu-
ous choice). Thus, instead of the dichotomous choice that we used in
our first experiment, the persons in the public good game determined
their degree of (non)cooperativeness in our second experiment. The
(bogus) feedback about the decision that a person (named person M)
would possibly make (beforehand conditions) or had actually made
(afterwards conditions) was, however, again the choice to contributeall his or her €10 to the common pool in the reward conditions or to
keep it all for himself or herself in the punishment conditions.
The delayed afterwards conditions were almost identical to the
directly afterwards conditions. However, after participants in the
delayed afterwards conditions received the feedback (but before we
asked them whether they wanted to assign points), they first had to
perform a dots‐estimation task (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Sivanathan,
Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008; Wang et al., 2011). In this 5‐min task
—which has been shown to decrease the intensity of emotions
because it interferes with emotional thoughts (see Wang et al.,
2011)—participants had to make a series of estimations about the
number of dots that were presented on their computer screen for
5 s. The feedback about Person M's (possible) choice remained on
the screen during the task. To rule out the possibility that performing
the dots‐estimation task itself (and not its distracting nature) would
influence our results, participants in the beforehand and directly after-
wards conditions also had to perform the dots‐estimation task. How-
ever, they performed the task both before we presented the
feedback and they could make their sanction decision. As such, partic-
ipants in all conditions performed the dots‐estimation task before they
made their sanctioning decision, but only in the delayed afterwards
conditions did it serve as a filler task between the feedback and the
sanctioning decision.
As in Experiment 1, participants were asked whether they
wanted to assign decrement/increment points, and if they decided
to assign points to person M, they indicated how many points they
assigned. In the beforehand conditions, participants were again
reminded that their decision would be executed if it would turn
out that person M had actually made this choice (i.e., their decision
was binding). The maximum number of points participants could
assign to person M was again 100 points (and the minimum was
zero points), and each assigned point would cost the participant
€0.10 but increased the personal outcome of person M with €0.30
in the reward conditions or decreased the personal outcome of per-
son M with €0.30 in the punishment conditions. In addition, we
again asked participants about their emotional reactions to the (pos-
sible) choice by person M.3.2 | Results
3.2.1 | Manipulation check
The manipulation of sanction type was checked by asking participants
whether they could assign increment or decrement points. All partici-
pants except one (99.1%) answered this question correctly. The
manipulation of decision timing was checked by asking participants
whether they had to decide about assigning increment points (decre-
ment points) beforehand, directly afterwards, or after a time delay. This
question was answered correctly by all participants except 15 (93%).
These 15 participants who gave an incorrect answer were mainly part
of the delayed afterwards conditions (11 participants), which suggests
that they did not recognize the filler task as a time delay. We conclude
that our manipulations were successful and included the data of all
215 participants in the analyses.
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We first performed a binary (Sanction Choice: 0 = not sanctioned,
1 = sanctioned) logistic regression (N = 215) to analyze the effects of
DecisionTiming (Beforehand vs. Directly afterwards vs. Delayed after-
wards) and Sanction Type (Reward vs. Punishment) on the proportion
of participants choosing to sanction. As predicted, the analysis yielded
a significant Decision Timing main effect, Wald (df = 2) = 19.70,
p < .001. Planned contrasts revealed that the proportion of partici-
pants choosing to sanction beforehand (65.2%) was significantly lower
than the proportion of participants choosing to sanction afterwards
(88.8%), regardless of whether they decided directly afterwards or
after a delay, B = 1.70, SE = 0.39, Wald (df = 1) = 19.29, p = .001, odds
ratio = 5.50, 95% CI [2.57, 11.76]. In addition, the proportion of partic-
ipants choosing to sanction directly afterwards (93.2%) did not differ
significantly from the proportion of participants choosing to sanction
after a delay (84.3%), B = 0.97, SE = 0.58, Wald (df = 1) = 2.84,
p = .092, odds ratio = 2.64, CI [0.85, 8.19]. Moreover, the significant
Sanction Type main effect, B = 1.29, SE = 0.40, Wald (df = 1) = 10.57,
p = .001, odds ratio = 3.62, CI [1.67, 7.85], showed that the proportion
of participants choosing to punish (71.0%) was lower than the propor-
tion of participants choosing to reward (88.9%).
Furthermore, the Decision Timing × Sanction Type interaction
effect was significant, Wald (df = 2) = 6.12, p = .047, not because
Sanction Type altered the difference in proportions of participants
choosing to sanction directly afterwards and after delay, B = 1.14,
SE = 1.16, Wald (df = 1) = 0.95, p = .329, odds ratio = 3.11, 95% CI
[0.32, 30.42], but because Sanction Type significantly altered the dif-
ference in proportions of participants choosing to sanction before-
hand versus afterwards, B = 2.01, SE = 0.83, Wald (df = 1) = 5.93,
p = .015, odds ratio = 7.48, CI [1.48, 37.84]. That is, the proportion
of participants choosing to punish beforehand (40.5%) was signifi-
cantly lower than the proportion of participants choosing to punish
afterwards (87.1%), regardless of whether they decided directly after-
wards (94.4%) or after a delay (79.4%), χ2(1) = 25.55, p < .001, odds
ratio = 9.94, CI [3.81, 25.95]. In contrast, the proportion of partici-
pants choosing to reward beforehand (93.8%) did not differ signifi-
cantly from the proportion of participants choosing to reward
afterwards (90.4%), regardless of whether they decided directly after-
wards (91.9%) or after a delay (88.9%), χ2(1) = 0.53, p = .467, odds
ratio = 1.57, CI [0.46, 5.36]. A possible explanation might be that,
due to the fact that, in Experiment 2, the persons in the public good
game had to determine their degree of cooperativeness (instead of
the dichotomous choice used in Experiment 1) and Person M
cooperated maximally (i.e., contributed all his or her €10 to the com-
mon pool), the willingness to reward was now so high (Molenmaker
et al., 2014, 2016) that a potential difference in the choice to reward
between the beforehand and directly afterwards conditions could
not be observed (i.e., a ceiling effect). See Table 1 for the frequencies.
3.2.3 | Sanction size
We analyzed the effect of Decision Timing and Sanction Type on the
number of points with a 3 (Decision Timing: Beforehand vs. Directly
afterwards vs. Delayed afterwards) × 2 (Sanction Type: Reward vs.Punishment) ANOVA (N = 215), which yielded a significant Decision
Timing effect, F (2, 209) = 9.07, p < .001, η2 = .12, 90% CI [.06, .19].
Planned contrasts revealed that the size of the sanctions administered
beforehand (M = 22.69, SD = 31.44) was significantly smaller than the
size of the sanctions administered afterwards (M = 42.30, SD = 31.44),
regardless of whether they decided directly afterwards or after a
delay, t(209) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.59, 95% CI [0.30, 0.88]. In addition,
the size of the sanctions administered directly afterwards (M = 44.95,
SD = 36.11) did not differ significantly from the size of the sanctions
administered after a delay (M = 39.54, SD = 38.05), t(209) = 1.06,
p = .289, d = 0.18, CI [−0.15, 0.51]. Moreover, the analysis yielded a
significant Sanction Type main effect, F (1,209) = 51.46, p < .001,
η2 = .18, CI [.11, .26], indicating that the size of the punishments
(M = 19.94, SD = 28.81) was smaller than the size of the rewards
(M = 51.38, SD = 37.95). Furthermore, the impact of Decision Timing
did not differ between reward and punishment, as indicated by the
nonsignificant Decision Timing × Sanction Type interaction effect,
F (2, 209) = 0.84, p = .432, η2 = .01, CI [.00, .04]. See Table 2 for the
mean number of points and standard deviation per condition.
3.2.4 | Emotional reactions
The effects of Decision Timing (Beforehand vs. Directly afterwards vs.
Delayed afterwards) on participants' positive emotions to the cooper-
ative choice (i.e., the reward conditions; N = 108) and negative emo-
tions to the noncooperative choice (i.e., the punishment conditions;
N = 107) were analyzed in separate analyses. A MANOVA on positive
emotions about the cooperative choice showed no significant (but
marginal) effect of Decision Timing, V = 0.157, F (10, 204) = 1.738,
p = .074, ηp
2 = .078. A MANOVA on negative emotions about the
noncooperative choice also showed no significant effect of Decision
Timing, V = 0.108, F (8, 204) = 1.461, p = .17, ηp
2 = .054. See
Table 3 for the overall means and standard deviations. Taken together,
these results again indicated that there was no difference between the
anticipated emotional reactions beforehand and the actual emotional
reactions directly afterwards, nor after a time delay.3.3 | Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 further corroborated our reasoning that
decision timing (beforehand vs. afterwards) impacts the willingness
to employ costly rewards for cooperation and punishments for nonco-
operation. Participants sanctioned less often and more mildly before
than after others' behavior. Experiment 2 also showed that the willing-
ness to sanction directly afterwards was not significantly different
from the willingness to sanction after a time delay. In addition, the
emotional reactions that participants reported did not differ between
conditions (as in Experiment 1). These findings are in line with our
explanation in terms of nonconsequential reasoning.4 | EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a public good game to operationalize
(non)cooperative behavior, and we demonstrated that deciding about
250 MOLENMAKER ET AL.sanctioning before rather than after its occurrence hampered partici-
pants' willingness to sanction. In Experiment 3, we aimed to replicate
this effect by using a different experimental paradigm. More specifi-
cally, we presented participants with a management scenario in which
they were department head of a company and one of their employees
might behave noncooperatively in the future (beforehand scenario) or
had behaved noncooperatively in the past (afterwards scenario).
An additional aim of this third experiment was to test whether the
beforehand scenario (but not the afterwards scenario) indeed induces
nonconsequential reasoning. As nonconsequential reasoning may
manifest itself in various ways (see also Shafir et al., 1993; Shafir &
Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Shafir, 1992), we assessed participants atti-
tude towards the employee's noncooperative behavior, their willing-
ness to sanction the employee, and the ease with which they could
justify punishment of the employee. If more nonconsequential reason-
ing occurs in the beforehand scenario (than in the afterwards sce-
nario), we expect that participants would hold a more ambiguous
attitude towards the employee's noncooperative behavior because
they may not yet have formed a clear (positive or negative) opinion
about it. Moreover, we expect that this would lead to a lesser willing-
ness to punish the employee and more difficulty to justify punishment
of the employee.4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants and design
Of the 133 participants we recruited from the Mechanical Turk
website, 102 participants (52 women and 50 men; Mage = 38.37 years,
SDage = 10.24) completed the whole experiment. Participants were
randomly assigned to be presented with either the beforehand sce-
nario (n = 49) or the afterwards scenario (n = 53).4.1.2 | Procedure
All participants first indicated their demographics before they were
introduced to the scenario. In the scenario, participants were
instructed to imagine that they—as department head of a technology
company—were conducting an annual performance appraisal with
one of their employees (named Mike7), who either might violate a
mutual agreement in the next year (beforehand scenario) or had vio-
lated this mutual agreement in the past year (afterwards scenario).
Next, participants completed our dependent variables.7For exploratory reasons, we also administered a version of the same scenarios
in which the employee was named Mary. This version did not replicate the find-
ings we obtained with the scenarios in which the employee was named Mike.
We acknowledge that the explicit mentioning of a female (vs. male) name in
the scenario might have had some unintended effects that could be of interest
(e.g., by being related to stereotypes among the research population). We felt
that a further exploration was beyond the scope of the current article, also
because in our laboratory experiments, participants were not informed about
the gender of the other group members.4.1.3 | Attitude
First, participants' attitude towards the (potential or actual) agreement
violation was assessed with three bipolar 11‐point scales ranging from
−5 via 0 to +5. Participants indicated how they judged (−5 = strongly
disapprove; 0 = neither disapprove nor approve; +5 = strongly approve),
perceived (−5 = very inappropriate; 0 = neither inappropriate nor appro-
priate; +5 = very appropriate), and evaluated (−5 = predominantly nega-
tive; 0 = neither negative nor positive; +5 = predominantly positive) this
behavior. An attitude score was computed by averaging the three
items (Cronbach's α = .97).
4.1.4 | Willingness to punish
Next, participants' willingness to punish the (potential or actual) viola-
tor was measured with six bipolar 11‐point scales ranging from −5
(very unlikely) via 0 (neither unlikely nor likely) to +5 (very likely). Partic-
ipants indicated how likely it was that they would reprimand, suspend,
terminate, discipline, reproof, and punish the employee. A punishment
score was computed by averaging the six items (Cronbach's α = .92).
4.1.5 | Ease to justify
Then, the ease with which participants could justify punishment of the
(potential or actual) violator was assessed. Participants were asked to
provide four pro‐arguments for punishing the employee,8 and subse-
quently they indicated on two bipolar 11‐point scales ranging from
−5 (very easy) via 0 (neither easy nor difficult) to +5 (very difficult) how
difficult it was to find proarguments and how difficult it would have
been to find additional proarguments for punishing the employee
(for a comparable procedure, see Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007).
An ease‐to‐justify score was computed by averaging the two items
(Cronbach's α = .84).4.1.6 | Manipulation check
Lastly, to check the manipulation of decision timing between scenar-
ios, participants were asked to indicate whether the agreement was
about the next year or about the past year. Four participants (3.9%)
answered this question incorrectly and were, therefore, left out of
the analyses, although including or excluding their data did not alter
the pattern of results.4.2 | Results and discussion
In line with our reasoning, participants hold a more ambiguous attitude
towards the agreement violation beforehand (M = −0.18, SD = 2.53)
than afterwards (M = −1.77, SD = 2.10), t(96) = 3.386, p = .001,
d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.28, 1.09], they were less willing to punish8We also asked participants to provide four arguments for not punishing the
employee and subsequently measured the ease with which they could justify
not to punish. The results of this measure showed no significant difference
between the two scenarios, t(96) = −1.324, p = .189, d = −0.20, 95% CI
[−0.60, 0.20], possibly because participants were asked to indicate their willing-
ness to sanction (and not their willingness not to sanction) in a prior question.
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(M = 0.21, SD = 2.37), t(96) = −2.250, p = .027, d = −0.46, CI
[−0.86, −0.05], and they found it more difficult to justify punishment
of the employee beforehand (M = 0.83, SD = 2.91) than afterwards
(M = −0.93, SD = 3.08), t(96) = 2.913, p = .004, d = 0.59, CI [0.18,
0.99].
Moreover, two bootstrapping analyses (with 10,000 resamples
and bias‐corrected and accelerated confidence intervals) using the
PROCESS Macro (Hayes, 2018) indicated that participants' attitude
towards the agreement violation mediated their willingness to punish
the employee (b = −0.57, p < .001, indirect effect = 0.90, 95%
bootstrapping CI [0.34, 1.61]) and the ease with which they could jus-
tify punishment of the employee (b = 0.35, p = .007, indirect
effect = −0.56, 95% bootstrapping CI [−1.09, −0.09]). More specifi-
cally, the significant effect of decision timing (beforehand vs. after-
wards) on the willingness to punish (total effect = 1.09, p = .027)
and the ease to justify (total effect = −1.76, p = .004) became nonsig-
nificant (direct effect = 0.19, p = .668) and marginally significant (direct
effect = −1.21, p = .054), respectively, when participants' attitude was
included in the models.
Taken together, these findings further demonstrate that deciding
beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning—and thereby ham-
pers the willingness to sanction—because people have not yet formed
clear sanctioning preferences.5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The decision to reward cooperation and to punish noncooperation
can be made at various moments in time. However, it involves a
decision either before or after others' behavior. In the present article,
we argued and showed that people are less willing to employ costly
sanctions when deciding beforehand than when deciding afterwards.
Research on the disjunction effect revealed that the presence of
uncertainty about outcomes may induce nonconsequential reasoning
and hamper decisiveness (e.g., Shafir & Tversky, 1992; Van Dijk &
Zeelenberg, 2003). In accordance with this work, we demonstrated
that people are less willing to administer sanctions that are contin-
gent on others' future behavior than on others' behavior that did
actually occur in the past. More specifically, people sanctioned less
often and sanctioned more mildly when decisions were made before
(instead of after) the occurrence of others' behavior (Experiments 1
and 2), regardless of whether they decided directly afterwards or
after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we showed that
beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet
formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). Thus, we
revealed that, due to nonconsequential reasoning, people are less
willing to employ costly sanctions if these sanctions are contingent
on others' future behavior.
The current findings not only increase the understanding of how
people make sanctioning decisions, but they also extend the literature
on the disjunction effect. Prior research has identified a disjunction
effect in the realm of social dilemmas, as people are more likely to
cooperate when they do not know whether their interaction partner
will cooperate compared with when they do know that theirinteraction partner had (not) cooperated (Shafir & Tversky, 1992,
study 1). Note that these conditions resemble the decision environ-
ment beforehand (in which another's behavior is also unknown) and
the decision environment afterwards (in which another's behavior is
also known), respectively. Although uncertainty about another per-
son's (non)cooperation may thus enhance the willingness to cooper-
ate, we add to this insight that, at the same time, it also hampers the
willingness to reward cooperation and punish noncooperation. An
interesting avenue for future research would be—besides investigat-
ing whether our findings conceptually replicate in other domains
than social dilemmas—to explore how people prefer to deal with this
uncertainty about another person's (non)cooperation. In our experi-
ments, but also in many real‐world social dilemmas, the sanctioning
decision had to be made. However, people might also be tempted
to wait with deciding about sanctioning until after others' behavior
is known (i.e., to avoid the uncertainty; cf. Keren & Gerritsen,
1999), they might want to be able to adjust their sanctioning deci-
sions afterwards (i.e., to make a decision that is not binding), or they
might opt for rewarding cooperation instead of punishing noncoop-
eration (i.e., to avoid inflicting harm on another person; cf.
Molenmaker et al., 2014).
In our experiments, the (anticipated) emotional reactions before-
hand versus the (actual) emotional reactions afterwards did not differ
from each other (Experiments 1 and 2), nor did the emotional reac-
tions (and the sanctioning decisions) directly afterwards versus after
a distracting time delay (Experiment 2). This suggests that the effect
of decision timing was not driven by the experience of emotions. It
is important to stress, however, that we do not claim that emotional
experiences may never be related to the impact that decision timing
can have on the willingness to employ costly sanctions. After all, emo-
tions have been identified as a potential driving force of sanctioning
decisions (e.g., De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2013; Nelissen & Zeelenberg,
2009; Seip et al., 2014), and the emotions that people experience
may differ in intensity and quality between the decision environment
beforehand and the decision environment afterwards (e.g.,
Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein &
Schkade, 1999; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015). The present research
revealed, however, that the experience of emotions directly after-
wards does not seem to be a necessary precondition of differences
in the willingness to employ costly sanctions before versus after
others' behavior. It would therefore be a good idea for future research
to investigate whether the experience of (intense) emotions would
amplify the impact that decision timing (beforehand vs. afterwards)
has on sanctioning decisions, for example, by experimentally manipu-
lating such emotions (see Seip et al., 2014).
In this respect, it is also important to note that we used a third‐
party paradigm in our experiments. In particular, in Experiments 1
and 2, participants were not involved in the public good game they
observed as third party (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Molenmaker
et al., 2014). Whereas this procedure eliminated the possibility that
participants' interpretation of the behavior was colored by self‐
interest, the willingness to sanction may be higher when they would
have taken part in the social dilemma themselves (i.e., a second‐party
paradigm) because in such situations revenge‐like motives might drive
the infliction of harm (e.g., see De Quervain et al., 2004). As such, the
252 MOLENMAKER ET AL.impact of decision timing might be different when people's personal
outcomes are affected by others' behavior. However, this is an empir-
ical question that has to be addressed in future research.
Although one should always be cautious when generalizing
experimental results to practice, some important implications may
be derived from our results. For instance, a large body of research
indicates that people are willing to sanction others' past behavior,
though, our findings indicate that one cannot immediately infer that
people are as willing to make binding sanctioning strategies in antic-
ipation of that particular behavior in the future, nor that people will
support systems that sanction future behavior. These insights are
relevant not only for researchers who study the implementation
and effectiveness of sanctioning systems but also for company
leaders and policymakers, as they often are the ones who install
sanctioning systems within their organization or society to promote
future cooperation. For instance, company leaders should realize that
the managers in their organization may find it difficult to make bind-
ing agreements with their employees about the required job perfor-
mance and the contingent positive and/or negative sanctions.
Moreover, policymakers should realize that the sanctioning systems
they install beforehand may deviate from what the general public
afterwards may consider the appropriate course of action. As such,
our work may provide a novel perspective on why there tends to
be a punitiveness gap in many Western countries between the
sentences that are actually administered in, for instance, court—
which largely depends on the present laws—and the sentences pre-
ferred by the public (e.g., Barber & Doob, 2004; De Keijser, van
Koppen, & Elffers, 2007; Hutton, 2005; Roberts & Hough, 2005). It
would, therefore, be interesting to explore in future research
whether this gap is related to the fact that laws (and the type of
punishment for breaking them) are determined beforehand, whereas
the public's perception is usually assessed afterwards.
Finally, we believe that our work makes an interesting contribu-
tion to the methodological debate about the behavioral validity of
the strategy method and the direct‐response method (e.g., Brandts
& Charness, 2011; Brosig et al., 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2012; Sel-
ten, 1967). Given that there are similarities between the two
response methods and the two timing moments that we distin-
guished in our experiments (beforehand vs. afterwards), the insight
that varying the timing of sanctioning decisions can lead to a dis-
junction effect in the willingness to sanction (non)cooperation may,
to some extent, also apply to the strategy method. Although the
strategy method asks people to respond to all feasible choices that
could possibly occur (in contrast to our experimental designs), the
occurrence of a disjunction effect in costly sanctioning suggests that
it is doubtful whether people have the cognitive and motivational
capacities to actually think through the implications of all possible
outcomes and form clear preferences (see Shafir & Tversky, 1992;
Tversky & Shafir, 1992). As such, it may very well be that the mixed
results of the studies comparing the strategy method with the
direct‐response method (see Brandts & Charness, 2011) could be
related to nonconsequential reasoning. Note, however, that we do
not argue that it is methodologically inappropriate to use the strat-
egy method. We mainly suggest that the strategy method may invite
nonconsequential reasoning because people are asked to respond toothers' choices before its occurrence. At the same time, however,
participants do so for all feasible choices that could possibly occur,
which may actually attenuate nonconsequential reasoning. To further
clarify this issue, future research should, therefore, investigate
whether the strategy method invites or attenuates the occurrence
of nonconsequential reasoning.6 | CONCLUSION
The present work substantiates that decision timing (beforehand vs.
afterwards) impacts the willingness to costly sanction. In our research,
we demonstrated that people sanction less often and more mildly
beforehand than afterwards, regardless of whether they decide
directly afterwards or after a time delay. Moreover, we showed that
beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet
formed clear sanctioning preferences. These findings imply that peo-
ple are less willing to use sanctions that are contingent on future
behavior than on behavior that did actually occur in the past. As such,
our findings shed new light on the willingness to costly reward coop-
eration and punish noncooperation. At the same time, we provide a
better understanding of the use of sanction opportunities to promote
future cooperation.
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